Pierre Bourdieu, one of the
foremost social philosophers of the 20th century, in his book Outline
of a Theory of Practice examined the social conditions that make objective
knowledge. Bourdieu delineates a three-tiered framework of theoretical
knowledge. The first element of this framework is ‘primary experience’ or what
Bourdieu also calls the ‘phenomenological’ level. This level is known to all
researchers in the field because it is the source of their basic descriptive
data about the familiar either of their own society or another. The second
level, almost as familiar, is the ‘model’ or ‘objectivist’ knowledge.
Here, knowledge ‘constructs the objective relations (eg. economic or
linguistic) which structure practice and representations of practice.’ In the third level, Bourdieu outlines the theory of practice. Bourdieu proposes that a
theory of objectivist knowledge will be a more rigorous and illuminating
theory of practice. He claims that a truly rigorous theory of practice is
accomplished by taking up the position of the realism of practice. Practice can
be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making. Structure and
habitus are part of Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the articulation of
disposition in social space.
The key concept of Bourdieu’s
formulation of a theory of practice is ‘habitus’. He defines habitus as a deep
structure generative of all thought and behavior, one that orients practice
without producing it. In the Outline of the Theory of Practice, he
defines habitus as composed of systems of durable, transposable dispositions,
“an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the
particular conditions in which it is constituted; the habitus engenders all the
thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions,
and no others.” Bourdieu emphasizes the unconscious nature of such schemes,
which are subjective but not individual. Rather, the cultural schemes installed
by the habitus are laid down in the earliest stages of life as basic
dispositions, or orientations, and operate equally as bodily dispositions and
mental operations that function, according to his metaphor, as “maps” of the
individual’s social worlds, generating thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and
actions limited by the historically and socially existing conditions under
which they are produced
‘Habitus’ is derived from 16th
century Latin, where it means ‘a way of being’. Bourdieu considered habitus as
a structured notion related to the way individuals and classes inhabit the
world. Habitus is a product of history, and produces the ‘collective practices and
hence, in accordance with schemes engendered by that history’. Habitus is
almost like a kind of ‘practice – generating grammar’ – a grammar that includes
psychological disposition. Through habitus, one internalizes the legitimacy of
one’s inclusion or exclusion from privileges. Acquiring habitus is perhaps like
acquiring a first language; no one can choose in the matter. With a given
habitus, there is a wide range of possibilities, just as grammar enables a wide
range of possibilities in a natural language. Habitus, then, is a kind of
grammar of actions that serves to differentiate one class (eg. dominant) from
another (eg. the dominated) in the social field. The boundaries between one
habitus and another are always contested because of its fluid nature. A habitus
allows for a certain degree of spontaneity, initiative and improvisation.
Hence, habitus makes social action and interactions possible without making
them predictable.
Habitus is connected, then to
Bourdieu’s view (or empirical discovery) that modern capitalist societies are
societies of inequality. Class conflict means that certain people receive a
disproportionate share of cultural, economic, and symbolic capital. Privileges
thus exist, and privileges generate privileges. Here, privilege should be
grasped as being manifest not only at the level of economic capital (level of
wealth) but also at the level of the symbolic (eg. education, language,
acquisition, aesthetic appreciation).
If habitus exists beyond the
consciousness of the individual, access to it can be gained only by collecting
a wide range of statistical and other data relating to the social life of the
individual. A specific habitus becomes evident when a range of variables
(occupation, education, income, taste in food, artistic performance etc.) are
shown, statistically to correlate with each other. Studies of parents’
occupation and educational attainment demonstrate that privilege is passed on
(children of doctors and highly professionals also tend to get into the medical
field). Studies of taste tend to suggest that privilege and the dominant
paradigms of taste are connected. Studies of academic institutions suggest
that, in the humanities and social sciences, a particular faculty with language
relates again to economic and social privilege. In effect, Bourdieu’s claim is
that once the objective data have been gathered across the board, it is
possible to construct a map of social privilege. A habitus is connected to a
lifestyle to the extent that it enables this lifestyle to be reproduced (which
means: enabling the same inequalities to be reproduced). Habitus, then, consists
of the transposable dispositions (transferable to a range of contexts),
perceptions and appreciation an individual acquires through being a member of a
given class, as this is articulated in a given set of material circumstances.
Structures constitute a
particular type of environment (eg. the material conditions of existence
characteristic of a class condition produce habitus, system durable,
transposable dispositions. Structured structures are predisposed to function as
structuring structures. It is necessary to abandon all theories which
explicitly or implicitly treat conditions and are entirely reducible to the
mechanical functionary of pre-established assemblies, ‘model’ or ‘roles’.
Bourdieu argues that ‘power’ is imbricated throughout society’s
institutions and practices and reproduced by these very institutions and
practices.
The importance of Bourdieu’s
project lies in his attempt to construct a theoretical model of social
practice. To him, all social life is essentially practical. Practice is located
in space and more significantly in time. Practice, according to Bourdieu is not
consciously or not wholly consciously organised and orchestrated. He
metaphorically considered social life as a game. All games have rules, the same
is true of social life. Games are learned through explicit teaching as well as
experientially in practice, the same is social competence. Social life cannot be
understood as simply the aggregate of individual behaviour.